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The Impact of Federal Subsidies
on State Functions
By JAMES R. RiCHARDSON*
"Must a government of necessity, be too strong
for the liberty of its own people, or too weak
to maintain its own existence?"
A. Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861.
The ensuing discussion can be advantageously oriented by
an inquiring look at the topic itself. Perhaps thoughtful inquiry
will lead the reader to observe, "what is a subsidy," and "what
are State functions?" The answers to both of these questions are
troublesome to reach, since the terms are not susceptible of exact
definition. That which is a subsidy to one governmental agency
may not be so regarded by another. Likewise, a conflict of inter-
ests may result in different interpretations by recipients and non-
recipients of Federal largesse. As for State functions, one's own
political philosophy can be expected to influence individual con-
cepts of legitimate State and Federal functions. Hence, under
changing social and economic conditions, that which is a State
function today may be regarded as a Federal function tomorrow.
These changing concepts cause the issue of States' rights to be
interjected, with resultant clamour for aid without Federal
strings attached, or for withdrawal of the Federal Government
from certain taxing areas. Further, in referring to the impact of
Federal subsidies on State functions, it becomes quite apparent
that the functioning of the State under Federal grants-in-aid is
of much significance. Thus, "State Functions" when analyzed in
context give rise to the questions, (1) what are legitimate State
functions and are they usurped by Federal subsidy programs, and
(2) how do Federal subsidies affect the functional aspects of
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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State governments? An attempt will be made to illumine these
and related inquiries as the discussion is developed.
"Subsidies" Identified
In a broad sense, subsidies refer to governmental grants to
individuals, private enterprise, or units of local government for
the ultimate public benefit. It is easier to identify a subsidy than
to define it, and far more useful. However, attempts within and
without the Federal Government have been made to define the
term with small success, at least, from a utilitarian standpoint.
As an example, the Department of Commerce has defined a sub-
sidy in simple terms as,
the monetary grant provided by government to private
business.'
Obviously, this definition is too narrow in that it would not in-
clude as subsidies such programs as pensions to disabled veterans,
forgiveness of taxes to new industry, or deficit spending by the
Post Office Department.
The Division of Audits of the General Accounting Office
in Washington has defined subsidy as,
financial aid or assistance given by the Federal Govern-
ment to private individuals or organizations or to non-
Federal Governmental entities.2
This definition it will be noted is much broader than the
first above, in that by the use of the word "assistance" a subsidy
is not limited to monetary aid. The definition also reflects the
fact that definitions often have a subjective flavor, meaning that
this Federal agency thinks of a subsidy as limited to a Federal
grant.
Next, a professor of economics has written an essay entitled,
"On Defining a Subsidy," in the course of which is stated,
Nearly every government action which impinges on the
private economy (and nearly every one does) is likely to
have what have been termed subsidy effects. The distinc-
tion between a 'subsidy simpliciter" and a 'subsidy effect'
I Survey of Current Business. National Income Supplement, 1951 Ed., p. 54.
2 Division of Audits, General Accounting Office, May 1954.
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is essentially political and not economic-it is one of pur-
pose. A subsidy can conveniently be defined in this ter-
minology as an intended subsidy effect, which the legisla-
ture (or other policy promulgating agency) foresaw and
desired when it authorized the particular activity giving
rise to the subsidy effect in question.3
Again, we see a definition being influenced by the thinking
of a specialist who sees a subject in terms of his particular field
of operations. It is natural that the economist thinks of political
and economic factors in defining subsidies, as indeed they pre-
dominate.
Finally, the Committee on Agriculture of the United States
House of Representatives recently stated in a report, in part,
The subsidy is the oldest economic principle written in the
laws of the United States . . . and there is no officially
recognized definition of a subsidy as such, and no un-
challengeable compilation can be made of the costs of
subsidies down through the years.
4
To the fact that subsidies have the undefinable character-
istic, may be attributed the difficulty of making a compilation of
total costs, rather than faulty bookeeping. This undefinability,
as has been mentioned, is due in some respects to conflicting
interests. For example, whether extensive Federal expenditures
on highway and street improvement constitute a direct subsidy
to the motor carrier industry is a subject of sharp controversy.
Railroad company representatives are strong in support of the
subsidy claim, despite public aid over the years in excess of one
billion dollars to promote railroad construction. 5 On their part,
representatives of motor carriers refute the subsidy argument by
asserting that taxes on gasoline, registration fees and mileage
assessments which go into the construction of public roads, meet
all of the costs properly attributable to them.
Price support programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation,
3lKaysen, Carl, On Defining A Subsidy. Public Policy; a year-book of the
Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, vol. 4, 1953, p. 9.
4 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, Gov-
ernment Subsidy Historical Review, (83rd. Congress, 2d session, Committee print).
June 3, 1954.
5. U.S. Federal Coordinator of Transportation. Public Aids to Transportation,
vol. 1, p. 19. The text refers to Federal grants and does not include loans under
favorable terms by agencies of the Government lowering of import duties on
railroad iron, and grants of right-of-ways over public lands.
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whereby farm commodity prices are maintained at levels higher
than would prevail in their absence would seem essentially to be
direct subsidies to farmers. Yet, many of these programs have
resulted in actual net gain to the Government.6 And, it is also
relevant to make inquiry as to the objective of price support
programs with respect to the subsidy issue. Are these programs
designed primarily as direct financial aid to farmers, or to
strengthen the over-all economy of the nation?
It has been said that the grant-in-aid program which unques-
tionably fitted the definition and characteristics of a subsidy was
that of the wartime consumer subsidies, in which the term of
subsidy was specifically used, and payments, designated as subsidy
payments, were made to producers with certain public objectives
in view.7 However, this is true only if the subsidy effect on the
producers outweighs the benefit sought and received through
the public objectives. Under this view of a subsidy, the significant
inquiry becomes, who is subsidized the most, or who is the sub-
sidy primarily intended to benefit? Food distributed in the
national school lunch program, to institutions and to persons in
low-income groups, seems on the surface to subsidize the con-
sumers of the food more than it does the producers. Yet, if the
distribution is made from surplus commodities, accumulated
under a price support program for farmers, the conclusion is
inescapable that the initial intent was to subsidize the producers.
So, the "intended effect" criterion is helpful in identifying a sub-
sidy and its beneficiary. As to what a subsidy is, the following
definition is set out as both comprehensive and useful, subject to
the inherent limitations of all definitions,
A subsidy may be defined as an act by the Government
involving either, (1) a payment, or (2) remission of
charges, or (3) supplying commodities or services at
less than cost or market price, whereby benefits to society
or a particular segment of society are anticipated.
From the foregoing definition and identification of a Federal
subsidy, or grant-in-aid, it may be concluded that a subsidy is
something given, forgiven, or released by a governing agency to
6 Legislative Reference Service Report, Subsidy Payments by the United
States Government Since 1940, p. 12.
7 Id, at 12.
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all or a classified portion of the governed, whereby certain bene-
fits, direct or indirect, are expected to inure, through subsidy
effect operating on the subsidized, to the ultimate benefit of so-
ciety as a whole, in order to satisfy the requirement of being a
legitimate governmental function.
History and Constitutionality
That governmental activity which is a novel departure from
established norms, which receives wide publicity through various
news media, or which makes the public increasingly tax con-
scious, can be expected to undergo critical public scrutiny. This
aroused public interest tends to supplant existing public apathy
with action. For instance, only when Congressional Committee in-
vestigations were subjected to the air waves and television cam-
eras in sensational proportions, did the general public begin to
demonstrate any real interest in the power of Congress to investi-
gate. The public was seeing something "new", little knowing or
caring that as early as the year 1795 Congress exercised its power
to carry on committee investigations and punish for contempt; or
that in 1832 the well known historical figure Samuel Houston,
was brought before the House of Representatives in contempt
proceedings, and was "reprimanded and discharged on payment
of fees."'
8
Likewise, increased activity of recent years through Federal
subsidies in the interests of national defense and economic sta-
bility has aroused intense public interest, with the result that
these programs have been condemned as statism, or approved as
a new and benevolent philosophy of government, as self-interest
dictates. As to the latter view, the contrary, as to newness, is cor-
rect. True, the subsidy has, in the past two or three decades,
reached into hitherto untouched fields, but, repeating the quote
from the House Committee on Agriculture, "the subsidy is the
oldest economic principle written in the laws of the United
States."
The record shows that in 1789 legislation .was passed by the
first Congress, which was similar in intent to some of the mari-
time subsidies of today. The first tariff act, enacted in that year,
8 8 Debates, 22nd. Cong., 1st. sess. 2512.
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stipulated that goods imported into this country on American
vessels should have a ten-percent reduction in custom duties,
and, further, a tonnage tax was imposed in favor of American
shipping.9 Actually, various types of direct grants-in-aid to par-
ticular business enterprises have been made in the United States
for more than a hundred years. These include payments to steam-
ship and railroad companies for carrying mail, financial aid to
shipbuilding enterprises, land grants to railroads and canal com-
panies, numerous aids to farmers, and silver purchases by the
Government.10
The first direct Federal subsidy was the award of mail sub-
sidies to private shipping industries in 1845, with preference to
ships convertible to vessels of war.1 Railroads received direct
subsidies in the form of land grants from 1850 to 1871 to aid in
new construction. All in all, railroads received Federal and State
grants approximating 183,000,000 acres, it having been estimated
that total public aid to railroads is in excess of $1,282,000,000.12
Historically, subsidies to private carriers, railroad and ship-
ping, and more recently air and motor, have been justified on
grounds of providing employment for individuals and capital,
contribution to national defense, and safeguarding American
business against discrimination. This is true in general, but too
often subsidies have been utilized to enrich the recipient rather
than to serve a public purpose.
Constitutionally, the legal basis for subsidies is found in that
provision of the Constitution empowering Congress to levy taxes
in providing for the common defense and general welfare.13 This
means that Congress acts in self-prescribed areas in determining
the "general welfare"; and the cases are legion drawing the thin
line of distinction between what is general and what is special
or local, under the judicial holdings that Congress must be ac-
corded wide discretion in defining the bounds of general welfare,
and the courts may not interfere with congressional action unless
it clearly and indubitably appears that the purpose for which a
9 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Government Subsidy
Historical Review, June 3, 1951, p. 1.
'OLibrary of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Subsidy Payments by
the United States Government Since 1940, p. 43.
11 Id. at 44.
12 Id. at 46.
13 U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1.
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tax is to be laid, collected and appropriated, is not within the
constitutional limitation.14
The history of Federal subsidies, when viewed retrospectively,
reveals a progressive pattern of increased Federal activity at local
levels. The first Federal grants were made to heavy industry
in encouraging and supplementing efforts of an expanding econ-
omy. The scope of these grants was later, at the turn of the cen-
tury, expanded to encompass the promotion of agriculture and
mechanical arts in developing the practical and vocational educa-
tion of a growing population.15 Next, subsidy programs gained
impetus during the economic depression of the thirties, when the
Federal Government acted to participate in State and local relief
programs on a rescue basis. Thusly, the Federal Government
assumed the traditional local jurisdiction of welfare functions,
where State agencies would not or could not proceed effectively.
This functional area has been gradually broadened and given
permanent status through price support, social security, unem-
ployment compensation, and other legislative welfare programs,
designed to maintain a stable economy.
This developmental process of Federal subsidies indicates a
broader concept of "general welfare" in relation to State func-
tions. However, it is even more significant in that concentra-
tion of subsidy effect on the individual, rather than on economic
expansion, points to the evolution of a frontier nation-state into
an industrialized state, with a shift of population from the land
to urban centers; it demonstrates mass psychological reaction
where the promise of secuirty dominates the desire for the re-
wards of risk; it marks a highly complex society in which the
adage, "that government is best which governs least" becomes
untenable; it foreshadows the march of an organized society
from the "haves" to the "have-nots" through over-industrializa-
tion, over-population and the exhaustion of resources; and per-
haps it implies that no society is capable of self-perpetuation due
to unequal distribution of resources, human avarice, and an in-
ability to reconcile conflicting interests of societal classes.
The foregong suggested impact of federal subsidization may
14Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Independence, Kansas, C.C.A. 1935,
79 Fed. 2d 32, 100 A.L.R. 1479.
15 Land Grant College Act of 1862, Hatch Act of 1887.
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appear obscure, and may as yet still lurk beyond the horizon of
human affairs, but it is alarmingly real and has been since the
inception of recorded history.
General Scope and Effect
In 1932 the Federal budget was less than five billion dollars,
in 1942 Federal expenditures were thirty-four billion dollars, in
1952 expenditures were sixty-six billion,16 and currently, 1957,
the proposed budget is just short of seventy-three billion dollars.
The ravages of two economically devastating world wars and
a great national depression, all experienced within one genera-
tion, have caused the costs of government to soar to new heights.
These cataclysmic blows at our economic, political and social
structures have led to new thinking on legitimate Federal "serv-
ices"; 17 leading in turn to a super-structure in Federal govern-
ment heretofore unparalled. To state a parallelism: for better or
worse, experience teaches us that the corporate system of doing
business has a centripetal attraction which draws wealth together
into aggregations of constantly increasing size, at the same time
throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer men. By
legitimate comparison, and for better or worse, we see the "busi-
ness" of Federal Government expanding at the expense of State
governments. The Federal Government necessarily functions at
an accelerated and expanded rate through the power to tax, as
new concepts of "general welfare" become part of governmental
policy.
It is not to be denied that the power to tax carries with it
the power to control. Hence, we see a central government grow-
ing stronger as the state governments become correspondingly
weaker, functionally speaking. This was perhaps inevitable under
a division of activities between Federal and State governments
which is the product of more than a century and a half of piece-
meal and haphazard growth at both levels. Just how long this
transition is to continue, depends upon the demands and expec-
16 National Association' of Manufacturers, Economic Policy Division Series,
Bring Government Back Home, No. 54, Dec. 1952, p. 7.
17This clause (Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1), cannot be construed in a narrow sense,
but it must be construed in the light of the fact that it is in the Constitution and
must deal with change in conditions,-Carolina Power Co. v. S.C. Public Service
Authority, D.C.S.C. 1937, 20 F. Supp. 854.
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tations of society in its embarkation upon "the road of no re-
turning."
Ours is a federated system of government under which a union
of states was formed, vesting in a central government certain
enumerated powers and retaining for themselves all powers not
so enumerated and expressly delegated. Under this local-central
form of government, proponents of a strong and beneficent cen-
tral government will argue that government subsidy programs
in furtherance of the general welfare constitute an activation of
constitutional powers which must not be static if that govern-
ment is to satisfy the existing objectives of a changing society.
On the other hand, opponents will maintain that just as no obli-
gation should be assumed by the community when it can be per-
formed by the individual, so, also, no function which can be ex-
ercised locally should be assumed by or delegated to another au-
thority.'8 The theory behind this argument is that the sovereign
states federated to delegate functions which only a central gov-
ernment can adequately perform. These functions include na-
tional defense and foreign affairs. And secondly, the delegation
theory includes a grant of power in the area where the several
states could perform the functions but which, if done by the
states, would adversely affect the people through lack of desired
uniformity. Examples are the postal service, weights and meas-
ures, coinage, interstate commerce and bankruptcy. Finally, all
powers not expressly delegated and which can be performed
locally, are not delegated, by implication or otherwise.
These contrary positions align Federalists against advocates of-
States' rights, and those who believe in the policy of Federal social
legislation, such as subsidies, against those who believe that the
Federal taxing power is subverted, when used to rehabilitate an
individual or private enterprise. Irrespective of the merits of these
positions, it is inescapable that inter-governmental activity
through dual agencies is expensive and likely to be inefficient.
Just as overlapping of city and county governments is a burden-
some duplication to taxpayers, so is State and Federal activity
in the social fields duplicative and costly. As a result of this
18 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Report of the Committee on Social Legisla-
tion, 1954, p. 1.
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confusion of functions, state and Federal taxgatherers subject
such sources as income, estates, alcohol, tobacco, gasoline, enter-
tainment and payrolls to duplicate taxation. These multiple
taxing units, responding to new needs, real or apparent, build
a house of cards, pyramided by successive legislation, and financed
by increased taxes in previously burdened fields, or by invasion
of new taxing areas. This definitely calls for an appraisal of
Federal-State relationships in connection with subsidy programs,
in order that fiscal and administrative functions may be adminis-
tered under definite policy statements, and in order that relative
national and local interests in the respective programs may be
defined.
Specific Impact
A survey has recently been completed by the Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations to determine the impact of
Federal subsidy programs upon the State, its administrative
structure, its economic and fiscal structure, and its political in-
stitutions.' 9 Since it is quite clear that the several States function
under governments of varying centralized strength, and have dif-
ferent economic problems, the survey was conducted in agricul-
tural and industrial States in seven widely separated areas, vary-
ing in size, wealth and population. 20 The survey investigated the
amount of Federal aid in each State, its allocation to education,
employment security, highways and public health and welfare, and
from the findings, recommendations as to future activity were
made. It may be assumed that the report was objective in that
the controversial question of States' rights was not raised.
In Connecticut, the survey-report states that aid is not limited
to need, that aid amounts are not justified, that formulas for
distribution are wrong, and that such unwarranted speed in
social improvement can result in transfering burdens from strong
voluntary sources of funds to the tax rolls. As to state political
institutions, the survey concludes that reliance on the Federal
Government has not been typical of the State, but that aid pro-
grams have strengthened Connecticut's functional departments.
19 Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Administrative and Fiscal
Impact of Federal Grants-In-Aid, June , 1955.
20 Id. Letter of Transmittal. The States surveyed were Connecticut, Kansas,
Michigan, Mississippi, South Carolina, Washington and Wyoming.
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The conclusion on this point is that aid is a dangerous expedient
if used to increase the vitality of a State Government.21
In Kansas, little impact was found to have been registered
on the State administrative structure, since most of the programs
were assigned to existing departments of government; the State's
economic and fiscal structure pointed to sound administration;
and Kansas' political institutions were not unduly influenced by
the programs. The survey disclosed that local officials, not ac-
tively connected with administration of the programs, expressed
a desire for more State control and less Federal influence.
22
In Michigan, the report states that the structure of the State
government has been insignificantly affected by subsidies, chiefly
because of its existing high level of services rendered. As to the
State's fiscal structure, grant-in-aid to Michigan constitutes only
ten percent of its total revenue and has had little identifiable
effect on the budget or revenue structure. Politically, the gov-
ernment of Michigan is described as organizationally complex
with considerable fragmentation of executive authority. This
factor, coupled with an uneasy political balance, makes difficult
the exercise of political leadership. From this basis, the report
concludes that Federal grant programs have done little to
strengthen the State Government as a political entity. Rather,
the divisive political situation has been emphasized by the close
professional and functional relationships that have grown up in
the grant fields between Federal and State officials.
23
In Mississippi, the survey finds that the caliber of the State's
roads, hospitals, health, welfare, and vocational education serv-
ices are attributable to Federal aids and standards which have:
stimulated efficiency in affairs of government; strengthened the
limited authority of the State Government and its Chief Execu-
tive; transferred some authority from State to Federal officials,
or at least habituated State officials to consult and be guided
by Federal officials; aroused no claim of invasion of State func-
tions; and has whetted the appetite of the electorate for increased
public service.
24
21Id. Ch. 1. Connecticut.
22 Id. Ch. 2. Kansas.
23 Id. Ch. 3. Michigan.
24 Id. Ch. 4. Mississippi.
1958]
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
In South Carolina, the report states that the bare semblance
of unity between State administrative boards has been fractured
by Federal aid programs. This leads to new islands of adminis-
trative autonomy, and as a result good practices in boards admin-
istering Federal aid under Federal standards has not led to good
administrative practices in purely State agencies. The main im-
pact on the State's fiscal structure has been to relieve it of tax
efforts which it is capable of making.
Politically, the office of Governor is weak in South Carolina
due to the large number of elected officials and independent
boards and commissions. Federal aid has introduced another
competitive element into this loosely knit structure, weakening
the office of Governor and strengthening the Legislature, through
its ability to lighten the relative tax load in rural communities.
Further, the general structure of local government is weakened,
rural leadership is strengthened, and federally supported State
agencies turn increasingly to the Federal Government for guid-
ance under the relatively weak leadership available to them in a
confused complex of State political institutions. 5
In Washington, the survey states the general reaction among
officials is that Federal aid is needed for certain services, but
the State would be better served if the Federal Government would
relinquish important tax sources and enable the State to finance
and control, in greater degree, its own affairs. This can in some
degree be traced to a further finding that a stronger allegiance
is felt vertically up functional fields, than is felt toward the legis-
lators and the Governor. This leads to the additional survey-
observation that "control inevitably follows the granting of
funds."26
In Wyoming, the survey reports that grants-in-aid have re-
sulted in the establishment of new State Departments of Welfare
and Security. There exists in Wyoming a centralized Executive
authority which has been strengthened by subsidy programs.
Generally, officials and employees do not understand the role of
the Federal Government in the determination of policies, stand-
ards, and financing of the respective grant programs, and look
to State officials on these matters. This means that, while Federal
25 Id. Ch. 5. South Carolina.
26 Id. Ch. 6. Washington.
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grant programs have an effect on local governments, State and
local agencies continue as integral relationships.27
The foregoing brief resume of an extensive and comprehen-
sive survey and report leads to the following observations, either
sensed or deducible, in reference to the Impact of Federal sub-
sidies on State functions:
1. Federal subsidies invade fields of human welfare which
in the past were traditionally reserved to the several states.
2. Federal subsidies have improved the service rendered by
state agencies to the people in public health, economic security,
education, and highway development.
3. A State agency in administering funds under Federal
standards becomes a more efficient governmental agency.
4. Federal aid programs strengthen a well-organized State
Government with central control, but cause a shift of power,
with a weakening of Executive authority, among loosely-knit
semi-autonomous administrative boards and commissions of a
State.
5. A grant of funds from one governmental agency to an-
other carries with it control and centralization, but their extent in
Federal aid programs is fluid and variable, depending upon the
cohesive quality of local State government, and not presently
definable with over-all exactitude.
6. This indefinability stems in part from failure to properly
correllate Federal aid through proper planning, and in part from
local variables.
7. Joint Federal-State administration of Federal subsidies
can be a deterrent to Federal usurpation of States' rights under
a strong Well-organized State Government.
8. There is a vital distinction to be made between the volun-
tary exercise of a "State function" by the Federal Government
and the usurpation of a "power" ordinarily reserved to and ex-
ercised by the State, though the distinction between governmental
and proprietary functions is illusory.
Thinking along corrective lines, suggested by defective ad-
ministration revealed by the survey, and to ease objectionable
impact, if any, on State functions, these suggestions are made:
27 Id. Ch. 7. Wyoming.
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1. The grant-in-aid is a device for providing joint Federal-
State participation in a defined program. As such, it is a develop-
ment of, and unique to, our constitutional federalism as a system
of government.
2. Many considerations govern the utilization of the grant-
in-aid in the total governmental process. The most important of
these are the necessity of balancing State and Federal interests
and the device's utility in accomplishing identified national ob-
jectives.
3. The Existing subsidy pattern reveals no dear-cut Na-
tional pattern with respect to the use of the grant device. Some
grant programs become permanent bridges for Federal-State
cooperation, but others are designed to accomplish specific short-
range objectives.
4. There is need for a positive effort to enlarge the role of
State policy formation, planning, and coordinating agencies with
respect to all grant programs.
5. More and more do problems of administrative control
call for cooperative regulation, and the trend is to fit administra-
tive procedure to problems, rather than force problems to fit a
rigid administrative procedure. This call for cooperative regula-
tion indicates a need for more intimate association of Federal
and State administrative resources in work on problems overly-
ing the State boundaries and requiring mobilization of resources
for effective programing. The result may be a finer balance of
power between State and Nation, and a counter-trend from
centralization of power in Washington as respects problems re-
gional or local in nature.
Conclusion
It is a thoughtless mistake to accept as a premise the inherent
malevolence of government. The American colonists did not
so believe, but, taught in the bitter school of English colonial
experience, they well knew that all government was not benevo-
lent. The basic premises from which their political thinking
and argument flowed were:
a. that human flesh is corruptible,
b. that power corrupts, and
c. that absolute power corrupts absolutely.
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They therefore set about, not to devise that form of govern-
ment which would be most efficient in the hands of good rulers,
but, rather, to fashion that form which would be most cumber-
some and inefficient in the hands of bad rulers. This may not
have been their declared and conscious motive, but, in effect,
such was their objective.
The discrepancies between these objectives are of the utmost
importance. For it may well be that the form of government
which is most effective in the hands of an absolute dictator, is
also the most efficient form of government that can be wielded
by a wise and benevolent ruler. On the other hand, a cumber-
some set of checks and balances, which has hamstrung some of
the noblest efforts of the few truly great statesmen this country
has produced, has also contributed mightily to the preservation of
our democracy through long periods of bad or mediocre political
leadership. To illustrate, except for the years of Lincoln, this
country did not have a single president of outstanding stature
during the forty-eight year period between the administrations of
Jackson and Cleveland, and yet this was a period of sustained
national growth and increasing prosperity.
The difference between these two approaches to the problems
of government has been much obscured by recent currents in our
legal and political thinking, but it remains of fundamental import-
ance. On the European continent, political thought has generally
inquired: What form of government is best suited to the highest
form of society? Or, what form will best aid a wise and good ruler
to rule wisely and well? This has been the approach with which
gifted immigrants like Hamilton with his "government by the
rich, the well-born, and the able," Schurz with his "government
by civil service," and Frankfurter with his gospel of "government
by experts," have tried to permeate our political thinking. For-
eign observers have with near unanimity criticized our Consti-
tution as a "conspiracy against government," criticized the "hope-
less inefficiency" of our governmental processes, and insisted that
an executive in America, be he president, governor, or mayor,
could institute reform in government only through a combina-
tion of foresight, fortitude, and extreme luck. Certain schools of
critics have taken the position that inefficiency, stupidity and
1958]
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corruption can be eliminated from our Government only to the
extent that we transfer governmental functions to the executive
or administrative agencies of government.
This influence has led some American intellectuals into the
hitherto exclusive domain of reactionaries, in ridiculing the legis-
lative branch and demanding centralization of power in the
executive.
These criticisms, leveled at inefficient methods in govern-
ment, bear a measure of truth. But they overlook the funda-
mental concepts of our inherited political thinking. That is,
Americans, generally, are more interested in avoiding the worst
government than in achieving the best. And are willing to abide
with checks and balances, bicameral legislatures, divided responsi-
bilities, limited authority, and red tape, though possible perfec-
tion in government is thereby irretrievably lost.
These concluding statements have been made as an elaboration
on a preceding observation in reference to the expense of dual
inter-governmental functioning in order to furnish a somewhat
philosophical justification. Accepting the developed premise as
holding to the view that a degree of inefficiency in a body politic
is a necessary burden borne by free men, it follows that we must
strive to maintain our tripartite government at State and Federal
levels; and continue to seek a rational distinction between State
and Federal functions while seeking to properly delineate Federal-
State relationships, in administering Federal subsidy programs.
